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This paper studies the effects of open-enrolment on student performance in the 
context of an admission reform in Stockholm. Before 2000, students had 
priority to the public upper secondary school situated closest to where they 
lived, but from the fall of 2000 and onwards, admission is based on grades 
only. The reform imposed strong incentives for school competition: all students 
can apply to all schools, there is no targeting of students to schools, and 
funding follows the students. It is shown that the students in Stockholm per-
form no better with increased choice availability. In fact, high ability students 
seem to perform worse after the reform. 
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IFAU – School choice and student achievement – new evidence on open-enrolment  2 1 Introduction 
In most countries, students attend their nearest school. School choice can 
simply be described as the possibility for students to choose other alternatives 
than their neighborhood school. The argument for increasing choice availability 
relies on the idea that students (or parents) prefer better schools. If there are 
financial incentives for schools to attract students, competition will then 
increase productivity, since it will be profitable to be a better school.
1
The effects of increasing the possibilities to choose among public schools 
have been debated over the last decades.
2 The available evidence mainly 
concerns charter school experiments in the US. In this literature, one can find 
some reliable evidence when the authors control for the selection issues 
associated with these reforms.
3 Cullen, Jacob & Levitt (2005) is one of the few 
studies on the effects of open-enrolment on student achievement. They study 
9
th graders in Chicago who are guaranteed a slot in a pre-assigned neigh-
borhood high school, but have the possibility to opt for other public schools in 
the district. Their results show that students are opting out of neighborhood 
schools, but that this behavior is not associated with any academic gains except 
for students in career academics.  
It is easy to explain why there are so few studies on open-enrolment: 
reforms of this type do usually not qualify as choice reforms since they fail to 
create competitive environments. That is, the choice process is often restricted 
by targeting specific students to specific schools, or there are no financial 
incentives for schools to attract students. This paper aims at shedding new light 
on the question of open-enrolment and student achievement by analyzing a 
reform that generated truly strong incentives for competition.  
In 2000, the Stockholm municipality changed the admission system of 
public upper secondary schools. A residence-based principle was abolished for 
a strict grade procedure. This means that all students can apply to all schools. 
Furthermore, funding follows the students, and since there are financial fixed 
costs this creates incentives for schools to attract students. There are no 
                                                      
1 For a discussion of the pros and cons of school choice, see Hoxby (2003b), and Fiske & Ladd 
(2000). 
2 See Björklund et al. (2005) for an overview of the school choice debate. 
3 Hoxby (2003a), Hanushek et al. (2005), and Bettinger (2005) are examples of studies on charter 
school experiments. However, their results differ: Hoxby (2003a) finds that charter schools 
improve student performance, while Hanushek et al. (2005) and Bettinger (2005) do not find 
such an effect.    
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schools. Hence, competition is so strong, that unlike most choice reforms 
(which usually are designed to help low-ability students), this reform could 
actually force low-ability students away from their neighborhood school.  
Söderström & Uusitalo (2005) have shown how the Stockholm reform 
affected the allocation of students across schools within the city. They show 
that student mobility and segregation – measured in terms of ability, immigrant 
status, and family background – increased.
4 This is clear evidence that the 
Stockholm students are exercising choice.  
This paper studies what impact the Stockholm reform had on student 
performance by utilizing a difference-in-differences strategy. The change in 
performance for Stockholm students before and after the reform is compared to 
the corresponding change for students in the surrounding municipalities, where 
the residence-based admission procedure is still in use.  
The results show that the students in Stockholm perform no better compared 
to the students in the surrounding municipalities after the reform. In fact, the 
point estimate suggests a decrease of about half a percentile rank on average; 
this estimate is insignificant however. The interaction estimates suggest some 
surprising and some interesting results. Surprisingly, estimates by ability show 
that losses due to the reform seem to be concentrated to the higher end of the 
ability distribution. Further, as a consequence of the reform, the school 
performance of immigrants was reduced by one and a half percentile ranks. 
Given the nature of the reform and the results in Söderström & Uusitalo (2005), 
this is not surprising, but still of interest. Also children from high-income 
families were hurt by the reform. The performance of these children decreased 
with a magnitude similar to that of immigrant children.  
The robustness checks suggest that the difference between groups to some 
extent can be explained by differences in completion probabilities. For 
example, the negative reform effects for immigrants and students from high-
income families are explained by changes in completion rates. Further, high-
ability students in Stockholm tend to complete to a lesser extent after the 
reform. However, the negative reform effect for this group is still significant 
conditional on completion. The robustness checks also show that the negative 
                                                      
4 Maybe the most interesting result in Söderström & Uusitalo (2005) is that segregation by 
immigrant status increases also conditional on ability. This suggests that the opportunities of the 
reform were not conceived by all immigrants, or that immigrants have different attitudes towards 
schooling.   
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students. 
Throughout the paper, school performance is measured by school grades. A 
priori this is not ideal. Therefore, considerable effort is put into examining 
whether the results are confounded by issues such as grade inflation and 
relative grade setting. These sensitivity checks suggest that the results are not 
distorted by having grades rather than, e.g., test scores, as a measure of student 
performance. 
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it is shown that this open-
enrolment reform has not enhanced student performance, at least not with 
respect to the first cohort of students affected by the reform. Second, it is 
shown that those who should gain in the choice process (i.e. those with high 
grades from compulsory school) do in fact perform worse with increased 
choice availability. The natural explanation seems to be that students misin-
terpret school productivities when they choose schools. That is, they only 
observe raw measures of student performance, such as grades and test scores, 
but they do not know whether they reflect educational production or student 
characteristics.
5 Hence, the findings and conclusions are very much in line with 
Cullen, Jacob & Levitt (2005).  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the Swedish school 
system, Section 3 the admission reform, and Section 4 the data. Section 5 
presents the results, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2  The Swedish school system  
The Swedish schools are governed by the municipalities within the guidelines 
and criteria set by the National Agency for Education. Each municipality is 
given funding from the federal budget, and is then free to determine how much 
to spend in the educational sector. At the municipal level, a specific amount of 
money is attached to each student, following the student to whatever school he 
or she attends.  
Sweden has nine years of compulsory schooling, between the ages of 7 and 
16. Almost all students that complete 9
th grade continue to upper secondary 
schooling, which consists of three-year programs. The programs can be of three 
                                                      
5 A more far-fetched explanation is that students choose schools based on non-academic criteria. 
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education), individual programs (intended to prepare the students for national 
programs later on), or special programs (for example handicraft or art).  
These programs were introduced in 1994 along with goal-oriented grades. 
The programs consist of courses, ranging from 50 to 200 points depending on 
the extent of the course. In total a program consists of 2 500 points.
6 Each 
course is given one of four possible grades; Fail, Pass, Pass with distinction, 
and Pass with special distinction, which earn the student 0, 10, 15, or 20 credits 
respectively. The final grade point average (GPA) is calculated as a weighted 
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where Pi denotes points, Ci credits, and subscript i indicates course. Thus, more 
weight is given to longer courses, and the GPA is ranging from 0 (worst) to 20 
(best). The subjects differ between programs; consequently the GPA is based 
on different subjects in different programs. However, there are eight subjects 
that all students have to take irrespective of program attended, the so called 
“core subjects”.
7 The average of the core subjects (GPA
core) is the main 
outcome measure used in this paper. 
All grades are set by the teacher, and should be given according to subject-
specific assessment criteria determined by the National Agency for Education. 
As further guidelines there are national tests in Swedish, Math, and English. 
There is no supervision of the teacher grade setting, and hence there is no 
guarantee that grading standards are equal across teachers.  
Students who began upper secondary schooling prior to 1994 were graded 
in a norm-based reference system. It is documented that the average grade has 
been increasing in Swedish upper secondary schools since the introduction of 
the goal-oriented grade system (Wikström, 2005). Wikström & Wikström 
(2005) study whether this increase is due to grade inflation induced by 
                                                      
6 This holds for 2000. Before 2000, courses ranged 20-200 points with a total of 2 150 or 2 370. 
7 The core subjects are Mathematics, Swedish, English, Sport, Religion, Art, Natural Science, 
and Social Science. 
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8 They do not find that intra-municipal school 
competition induces grade inflation among public schools; however, their 
results suggest that private schools inflate grades. 
Historically, private schools have been very rare in Sweden. However, after 
a school reform in the beginning of the 1990s which made private schools 
entitled to municipal funding the number of private schools has been in-
creasing, particularly in the metropolitan areas. The few private schools that are 
financed by tuition fees and are using selection rules are not entitled to 
municipal funding.  
 
 
3  The Stockholm admission reform  
The responsibility for the educational system rests in the hands of the 
municipalities. Hence, the municipalities can choose admission procedure to 
upper secondary schooling. Stockholm changed this procedure in 2000.
9 The 
students who began upper secondary schooling in the fall of 2000 were the first 
cohort in a system where admission is based on grades only. Students apply for 
a specific program in a specific school. If they are not accepted to their first 
choice, a second is considered, and so forth. Note that there can only be one 
first choice, not one first choice per school. Prior to 2000, students applied for a 
program only. Given acceptance (based on grades), students were allocated to 
their nearest school.
10 It should be noted that the reform did not change the way 
in which students from outside Stockholm could apply for schools within 
Stockholm.
11   
                                                      
8 The authors compare grades from upper secondary schooling with SweSAT test scores, the two 
main routes for applying to university. The SweSAT is given twice a year throughout the country 
and is open to anyone. 
9 The decision was taken by the centre-right wing coalition of Stockholm on October 18, 1999. 
10 The residence-based principle is best described with an example. The Local Admission Unit 
counted the number of slots in total for each program in the public schools, for example 300 for 
the program in Natural Science. The students only applied for a program, and they were ranked 
according to grades. To the program in Natural Science, the 300 with best grades were accepted. 
Given acceptance, the Local Admission Unit studied every single student, and allocated them to 
schools by address, minimizing travelling distance to school.   
11 A student from outside Stockholm can apply for a national program within Stockholm if that 
program is not given in the municipality where the student resides, and if the home-municipality 
does not have an agreement with another municipality. 
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school choice reform. The funding follows the student, making the schools 
financially dependent on how many students they attract. Furthermore, schools 
have the possibility to take on more students, or lose students. However, in 
contrast to most other choice reforms - for example voucher initiatives in the 
US, which often are directed to increase choice availability among low ability 
students - this reform could actually be detrimental to low-ability students if 
they were no longer admitted to their neighborhood school.  
The argument in favor of school choice is that extending choice increases 
competition. Hence, the next question is if there was an increase in 
competition. Söderström & Uusitalo (2005) conclude that the mobility of 
students, as well as sorting of students over schools, increased in Stockholm in 
response to the reform. For example, the average commuting distance for a 
student increased from 4.2 km in 1999 to 4.8 km in 2000, and the segregation 
by previous grades increased from 40% to 54% over the same period. This is 
clear evidence that students are exercising choice, leading to increased school 
competition. There is also considerable evidence in how schools nowadays are 
promoting themselves.
12 But perhaps the best argument for increased 
competition is the fact that some public schools are struggling for survival. In 
fact, it was recently decided that one of the schools had to be shut down. Thus, 
arguably school competition has increased in Stockholm after the reform.  
 
 
4 Data   
The data come from Statistics Sweden.  It is constructed by all students 
registered the first semester at an upper secondary school situated in the 
Stockholm County.
13 Stockholm County consists of 26 municipalities. The 
Stockholm municipality (hereafter simply denoted Stockholm) is the treatment 
group and the other 25 municipalities constitute the potential comparison 
group. Data are available for six consecutive years, from 1995 to 2000, and 
give information on at which school and program the students are registered. 
Note that data only include one post-reform cohort. To these data, personal, 
                                                      
12 For example, there are exhibitions for ninth-graders, and advertisements in newspapers. 
13 The population of students is defined using the register of applicants and admissions to upper 
secondary schooling. 
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matched to the students.
14  
The data are restricted in three ways. First, only students attending national 
programs are used. The reason is that individual programs are preparing the 
student for taking national programs later on, and the special programs are 
diverse and not easily comparable. In both treatment and comparison groups, 
about three quarters of the students register at national programs. Second, since 
grades from upper secondary schooling are only available until 2003, grades 
are only used for those students completing in the stipulated three years time. 
Third, a small number of individuals (less than 1% of the sample) are excluded 
due to missing information on compulsory school grades. 
Table 1 reports background characteristics for Stockholm (S) and the 
Comparison group (C) for each year. The students are sorted into the two 
groups depending on where the upper secondary school they are registered at is 
located. Immigrant status is defined as those who are born outside Sweden, or 
has at least one parent who is born outside Sweden. Parental education is an 
indicator equaling unity if the student has at least one parent with a university 
degree. Parental earnings (in thousands of SEK) are the sum of the parents’ 
earnings, thereby also capturing the effect of having one or two (working) 
parents. The compulsory school GPA is percentile ranked over both groups.
15 
Compulsory school GPA
SME corresponds to the average of the percentile 
ranked grades in Swedish, Math, and English. Table 1 also includes 
information on the share of students in private schools, and the number of 
schools and students. Data include further information (not shown in tables) on 
compulsory school attended, residential information (municipality where the 
student resides), and program attended.  
                                                      
14 Different registers from Statistics Sweden are used. The education registers of compulsory and 
upper secondary schooling give educational information and grades. Information on personal and 
family characteristics comes from a longitudinal register of education and income, which is a 
combination of income tax registers, population censuses, and other sources. 
15 Note that students leaving compulsory school prior to 1998 were graded on a norm-based scale 
from 1-5, and from 1998 and onwards in the goal-oriented system. 
IFAU – School choice and student achievement – new evidence on open-enrolment  9 Table 1 Characteristics by year of entry into upper secondary school.  
    1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 























































































































































































































#  schools S  30 32 30 33 34 41 
  C  44 46 48 47 50 56 
# students   S  6 754  6 823  6 683  5 989  6 245  6 556 
  C  10 883  11 439  10 928  9 975  9 477  9 686 
Note: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Immigrant status is defined as 
those who are born outside Sweden, or has at least one parent who is born outside 
Sweden. Parental education is an indicator equaling unity if the student has at least one 
parent with a university degree. Parental earnings are the sum of the parents’ earnings, 
measured in thousands of SEK. Compulsory school GPA is percentile ranked over both 
groups per year. Compulsory GPA
SME is the average of the percentile ranked grades in 
Swedish, English, and Math.  
IFAU – School choice and student achievement – new evidence on open-enrolment  10According to Table 1, the composition of students in 1995 is fairly similar 
in the two groups. However, the composition in Stockholm appears to change 
over time. For example, the share of females in Stockholm increases from 
47.7% in 1997, to 51.4% in 2000, while it remains fairly constant in the 
comparison group. The share of students from families with an academic 
background increases from 48.9% to 52.5% in Stockholm over the same 
period, and parental earnings increase by more than in the comparison group. 
The share of immigrants, on the other hand, has a similar time pattern in the 
two groups. 
The explanation for the observed changes in student composition seems to 
be found in the share of students attending private schools. Between 1997 and 
2000, this share increased from 5.1% to 20.7% in Stockholm. The number of 
schools increased from 30 to 41 over the same period, exclusively due to new 
private schools. Further, compulsory school GPA increases from 51.4 in 1997, 
to 55.4 in 2000. As the average GPA for public school students only increased 
from 50.4 to 52.8 during the same period it appears that there was an inflow to 
Stockholm of high ability students attending private schools. It should be noted 
that the bulk of the increase in the share of private school students in 
Stockholm occurred between 1997 and 1999. For the reform year (between 
1999 and 2000), the share of students in private schools increased by about the 
same amount in both groups.  
Table 2 displays information on student performance at the upper secondary 
level. Grades from upper secondary school are shown as a weighted average 
over all grades (GPA), and over core subjects (GPA
core). The grade measures 
are percentile ranked over the full sample of completing students. Upper 
secondary schooling is intended to last for three years, and a considerable 
fraction of the students fails to get a final grade within these three years. The 
share of students not completing in the stipulated time corresponds to these 
students.  
Grades are higher in Stockholm than in the comparison group, and the 
difference gets larger over time, as can be seen in Table 2. The GPA in 
Stockholm increases from 52.86 in 1995 to 54.32 in 2000, and the same pattern 
holds for GPA
core. These changes come as no surprise since Table 1 shows that 
Stockholm students have increasingly better compulsory school grades. Table 2 
also shows that the share of students completing in three years varies around 
two thirds, with no clear pattern and no marked differences across the two 
groups. In all, Table 2 does not indicate any reform effects. 
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    1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 

















































Share of students 

























Note: Standard deviations within parentheses. GPA and GPA
core  are for each year 
percentile ranked over the full sample of completing students. The core subjects are 
Mathematics, Swedish, English, Sport, Religion, Natural Science, Social Science, and 
Art. The share of students completing in the stipulated time corresponds to the students 




This section begins with a brief descriptive analysis. Then the difference-in-
differences model is specified and estimated on the full sample to identify 
average treatment effects, and on sub-samples to identify heterogeneous 
treatment effects. Robustness checks include the impact of sorting, relative 
grade setting, completion rates, and grade inflation.  
  
5.1  Between school variance in student outcomes 
According to the descriptive statistics in Table 2, Stockholm students have 
higher upper secondary grades than the students in the comparison group. This 
difference becomes larger over time but it is hard to spot any indication of a 
reform effect. In order to examine whether there are any easily depicted effects 
of the reform on grades, the school level is studied. Since the sorting of 
students with respect to compulsory school grades changed after the reform, we 
should also expect the differences between upper secondary schools to increase 
in terms of student performance.  
IFAU – School choice and student achievement – new evidence on open-enrolment  12Table 3 presents ANOVA-results on the between school variance in student 
outcomes. Percentile ranked core grades are regressed on school fixed effects, 
and the results presented are the R
2-adj from these regressions.  
The upper part of Table 3 shows the result for all schools. It can be noted 
that the between school variance is larger in Stockholm, and that it is fairly 
stable for the years prior to the reform. More importantly, the results indicate a 
reform effect in Stockholm. In 1999, 20.7% of the variation in core grades 
could be explained by school attended; this figure increases to 29.7% in 2000. 
The magnitude of the increase is much larger than in the comparison group. 
 
Table 3 Between school variance in student outcomes. 
  R
2-adj from regressions of core grades on school fixed effects 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
All schools       
Stockholm 0.116  0.178  0.184 0.174 0.207 0.297 
Comparison  0.062 0.061 0.072 0.104 0.107 0.134 
Public schools
      
Stockholm 0.089  0.145  0.160 0.125 0.155 0.261 
Comparison  0.058 0.039 0.055 0.069 0.059 0.077 
 
The observed pattern could be due to private schools. The lower part of 
Table 3 presents the same analysis, now using students in public schools only. 
The pattern is even stronger among public schools: the between school 
variance among public schools in Stockholm increases from 15.5% to 26.1% 
between 1999 and 2000.  
Due to the selection issue discussed above, this result comes as no surprise. 
An increased sorting of students by ability over schools contributes to the 
observed pattern. Nonetheless, this is a clear indication that the reform affected 
students at upper secondary level. The next section studies the impact of the 
reform on student performance.  
 
5.2  Reform effects on student outcomes 
In order to identify the causal effect of the reform on student performance, a 
difference-in-differences analysis is used. That is, a comparison group is used 
IFAU – School choice and student achievement – new evidence on open-enrolment  13 to resemble what the situation would have been like in Stockholm without the 
reform. A fundamental criterion for this identification strategy to work properly 
is that there are no differences in trends in the outcome measure between the 
two groups. If such a difference exists, it will be captured by the reform 
indicator and bias the estimated reform effect.  
For this study, five pre-reform years (1995-1999) and 25 municipalities 
constituting a potential comparison group are available. Hence, pre-reform 
trends at the municipal level can be estimated, and by applying a common 
support restriction municipalities with trends significantly different from 
Stockholm will be excluded from the Comparison group. Appendix A de-
scribes how this procedure is conducted, and how four municipalities were 
excluded according to the common support restriction. The model specification 
then boils down to a difference-in-differences analysis for 1999-2000. It is 
worth noting that potential problems with the inflow of private school students 
to Stockholm (see Table 1) are minimized using this procedure, since this 
compositional change mainly occurred prior to 1999.  
Equation (1) below is estimated over the years 1999-2000. The dependent 




Subscript  i denotes student, s school, and t  time. Explanatory variables are 
personal characteristics (Xist), school dummies (γs), time dummies (γt), and a 
product of a Stockholm school indicator with the year 2000 (SS
2000). The 
reform effect is identified through SS
2000. The personal characteristics include 
age, gender, immigrant status, parental education, parental earnings (percentile 
ranked since the mean and variance vary over time), program, municipality 
where the student resides
17, compulsory school GPA
18, and compulsory school 
attended.  
 
(1)          
2000
ist it t s ist
core
ist SS X GPA ε ϕ γ γ β α + + + + + =  
 
Students may be affected differently by the reform. Some students did react 
to the new opportunities and attended a school which they otherwise would not 
                                                      
16 If a student has not completed upper secondary schooling in three years, (s)he is given the 
grade 0.  
17 Students living outside the Stockholm County are grouped into one category. 
18 The specification assumes a linear effect of compulsory school grades. More flexible 
functional forms with dummies per quintile or decile have been tried, and the results are virtually 
unchanged. The results are also very similar using ordinary grades instead of percentile ranks. 
IFAU – School choice and student achievement – new evidence on open-enrolment  14have had access to. Other students were forced away from their neighborhood 
school due to competition. By estimating separate regressions by gender, 
grades from compulsory school, family background and immigrant status, 
potential heterogeneous treatment effects are examined. Table 4 displays the 
results (reform effect estimates) for the full sample, and when the sample is 
restricted to specific groups.  
Column (1) in the upper part of Table 4 presents the average treatment 
effect. According to the table, the students in Stockholm perform half a 
percentile worse after the reform, however, the result is not significant. Column 
(2) includes only students attending public schools. Compared to the average 
effect in column (1) there is a small decrease in the magnitude of the reform 
effect. The estimate is still insignificant, though. Thus, it does not matter 
whether we consider public or private schools. In column (3) only those 
students attending theoretical programs are included, and the effect is larger in 
absolute value, 1.13, but still insignificant.
19  
Column (4) and Column (5) present separate regressions by gender. The 
results are striking. Females perform significantly worse after the reform with a 
point estimate of -1.81, while the reform effect for males is insignificantly 
positive.    
The mid-section of Table 4 shows the impact on students with different 
ability, measured by compulsory school grades. The results are displayed for 
the four quartiles of ability; Q1 being the lowest, and Q4 the highest achieving 
quartile. The results indicate substantial differences between groups. The 
lowest achieving quartile has a positive insignificant estimate, 1.15. Quartile 2 
and 3 perform significantly worse after the reform with point estimates of -2.00 
and -2.47 respectively. The top achieving quartile has an insignificant estimate 
of -2.29 (p-value 0.125).  
The lower part of Table 4 presents result where student performance is 
studied according to immigrant status and socio-economic background. Low 
parental education indicates students for which neither parent has a university 
degree. Low parental earnings indicate if the students’ parents belong to the 
lowest quartile in the parental earnings distribution. Correspondingly, high 
parental earnings are the top quartile of the earnings distribution. Students with 
high-income parents are performing significantly worse after the reform, with a 
point estimate of -1.75 percentile ranks. Likewise, immigrants do perform 1.5 
percentile ranks worse (significant at the 10%-level). 
                                                      
19 The programs in natural and social sciences are academic tracks, denoted theoretical programs. 
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Average reform effect and effects in public schools, theoretical programs, and by gender 















2-adj  0.545 0.542 0.495 0.530 0.551 
N  28 811  24 295  17 039  13 951  14 860 
  Reform effects by quartiles of the ability distribution 











2-adj  0.178 0.162 0.198 0.209 
N  7 441  7 280  7 139  6 951 
  Reform effects by immigrant status and socio-economic background 
















2-adj  0.533 0.519 0.496 0.491 
N  10 421  15 149  7 041  7 038 
Note: The outcome variable is percentile ranked core grades. Regressions include a 
constant, and controls for gender, age, immigrant status, compulsory school grades, 
parental education and earnings, time effects, upper secondary school attended, 
compulsory school attended, program, and municipality where the student resides. Low 
parental education identifies students without parents with a university degree. Low 
(high) parental earnings define students with parents in the lowest (highest) quartile of 
the parental earnings distribution. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.   
Significance level: * = 10%, ** = 5%, and *** = 1%.    
 
The results seem to be driven by high ability students. This result is 
surprising. One would have expected that students with high grades from 
compulsory school should gain from the reform since their choice opportunities 
increased. But those who can exercise choice due to good grades do not seem 
to have benefited from this opportunity; their grades have even turned for the 
IFAU – School choice and student achievement – new evidence on open-enrolment  16worse in some cases.
20 Possible explanations to this unexpected pattern are 
discussed below. 
 
5.3 Robustness  checks   
The results could be driven by the inclusion of school fixed effects in the 
model. That is, if the school effects capture the ranking of individuals within 
schools, this could potentially drive the estimated reform effects. To investigate 
this issue the estimations are done without school fixed effects. If the 
hypothesis just stated has an impact, the differences between the quartiles of 
the ability distribution in Table 4 should diminish. The results (not shown), 
however, barely change but become more precisely estimated. For example, the 
lowest achieving quartile performs 1.1 percentile ranks better after the reform, 
and Quartile 3 perform 2.2 percentile ranks worse after the reform (both 
estimates are significant at the 5%-level).     
Another worry is that teachers are reluctant to give high grades to all 
students in a high achieving class, i.e. grade-setting is relative. In principle, this 
should not be the case since the grading standard is goal-oriented. By including 
average peer quality in the regressions, it is possible to get a test for the impact 
of the student composition, which may affect individual outcomes through, for 
example, peer effects or relative grade-setting.
21 The average compulsory grade 
per school and program is included additively in the regressions underlying 
Table 4. In all specifications the reform estimates are totally unchanged, and 
the direct effect of the peer quality is small and negative (and in most cases 
insignificant). The conclusion is that the student composition does not drive the 
results; even though there may be relative grade setting it does not affect the 
estimated reform effects.  
The analysis has so far included students not completing in the stipulated 
three years time, giving them the grade 0. Table 5, which is organized in the 
same way as Table 4, presents results conditional on completion. The first row 
                                                      
20 Due to the design of the reform and the residential segregation by income in Stockholm, one 
did suspect that high ability students from low income families should gain by the reform, and 
that low ability students from high income families should be potential losers. Interaction 
estimates of ability and parental earnings do not support this conjecture. 
21 The peer effect argument is that individual achievement is affected by the other students in the 
class-room. The literature on peer effects has shown that the peer composition do affect 
individual performance; see for example Sacerdote (2001), and Falk & Ichino (2006). The 
presence of relative grade-setting would imply that it is more difficult for high-achieving 
students in Stockholm to get high grades after the reform, since they on average attend classes 
with better peers. 
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third of the students are excluded. Row (2) shows the reform effects using 
GPA
core, and row (3) extends the outcome variable to the ordinary GPA. The 
results obtained with GPA
core will be considered first. 
The results in the second row of Table 5 indicate that completion does 
matter, at least to some extent. The average treatment effect is more or less 
unchanged when conditioning on completion, but the effects in the sub-groups 
change. Overall, the differences between treated and comparison groups 
become smaller. In particular, unconditional on completion we observed a large 
difference in the point estimates between genders. This difference does not 
exist conditional on completion, where both genders have an insignificant 
effect of about -0.6.
22 However, for theoretical programs the reform effect 
become negative and significant (at the 10%-level), with a point estimate of 
1.02.  
The effects over the ability distribution change as well. All quartiles now 
have negative point estimates, and the differences between the quartiles are 
smaller. The largest effect is found in quartile 3 (the 50-75
th percentiles of the 
compulsory grade distribution) with a significant point estimate of -2.19. The 
expected pattern of completion rates is seen in number of completed students 
per quartiles. Only 37% of the lowest achieving quartile actually completes, 
while the corresponding figure for the top achieving quartile is 87%.  
Comparing the bottom sections of Table 4 and 5, we see that the 
significantly negative effect for immigrants is explained by changes in the 
probability of completion. Also concerning socio-economic background the 
negative reform effect gets closer to zero conditioning on completion.  
According to Table 5, variations in completion rates seem to be driving 
many of the notable differences between treated and comparison groups 
observed in Table 4. In general, completion rates have gone done in Stockholm 
among groups of high-achievers after the reform, while the opposite is true 
among low-achievers. The sole exception from this general pattern is 
immigrants.   
The third row of each section in Table 5 displays the results on the ordinary 
GPA. The average effect, -1.15, is significant at the 5%-level. In the theoretical 
programs the reform effect is -1.97, significant at the 1%-level.  
 
                                                      
22 By means of the information provided on sample sizes, it can be seen that 69% of the females 
do complete, and only 62% of the males.  
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Average reform effect and effects in public schools, theoretical programs, and by gender 
 All  students  Public  Theoretical  Females  Males 
   schools  programs     
N  18 853  15 780  12 382  9 652  9 201 
GPA

























Reform effects by quartiles of the ability distribution 
  Q1 (low)  Q2  Q3  Q4 (high) 
N  2 751  4 465  5 596  6 041 
GPA





















Reform effects by immigrant status and socio-economic background 






N  6 299  8 882  3 872  5 407 
GPA




















Note: Row (1) shows the size of the restricted sample, and row (2) and (3) shows the 
reform effects conditional on completion by using GPA
core and GPA as the outcome 
measure respectively. Regressions include a constant, and controls for gender, age, 
immigrant status, compulsory school grades, parental education and earnings, time 
effects, upper secondary school attended, compulsory school attended, program, and 
municipality where the student resides. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.   
Significance level: * = 10%, ** = 5%, and *** = 1%.    
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remains: the observed effects are largest among those with high compulsory 
grades. In the highest and second highest achieving quartiles the effects are       
-2.57 and -3.31 percentile ranks respectively, significant at the 1%-level. 
Hence, when students who do complete in the stipulated time are compared 
over the ordinary grades instead of the core subjects, the effects are larger and 
tend to be statistically significant to a greater extent. It thus seems that the 
negative reform effect is stronger for those subjects not being core subjects. 
The final sensitivity analysis concerns grade inflation. Appendix B provides 
tests for the potential impact of grade inflation at compulsory and upper 
secondary level. The most relevant concern is perhaps grade inflation in 
Stockholm at compulsory level, since there are incentives for parents and 
students to put pressure on teachers to inflate grades after the reform. However, 
by restricting the compulsory grade variable to only include those subjects 
where there are national tests (and where there is arguably less or no grade 
inflation), the estimated reform effects are unchanged. Furthermore, the 
analysis gives no indications that grade inflation at upper secondary level 




This paper evaluates a reform of the admission system to public upper 
secondary schools in Stockholm. A residence-based procedure was changed 
into a grade procedure. This open-enrolment reform has earlier been shown to 
strongly affect the distribution of students over schools. In this paper it is 
shown that the Stockholm students perform no better with increased choice 
availability. In fact, it seems that the effect is negative for students with high 
compulsory school grades.  
Given the nature of the reform, potential distributional consequences along 
the ability dimension would have been expected to be the reverse. That is, low 
ability students were conceived as potential losers since they became restricted 
in the choice process. It should be noted that some of the differences between 
groups can be explained by differences in completion probabilities. High-
ability students in Stockholm tend to complete to a lesser extent, while low-
ability students completes to a greater extent. However, some of the surprising 
distributional effects seem to persist over alternative specifications. 
IFAU – School choice and student achievement – new evidence on open-enrolment  20The most plausible explanation seems to be that students misinterpret school 
productivities when exercising choice, a point also made by Cullen, Jacob & 
Levitt (2005). Students only observe crude measures of student achievement in 
terms of grades and test scores, and they have no opportunity to judge whether 
these outcomes reflect educational production or student characteristics, i.e. 
educational input.  
Having said this, one should keep in mind that this paper only uses one 
post-reform cohort, and school competition may need more time. The longer 
run effects are perhaps more favorable to the proponents of school choice. 
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This study utilizes a difference-in-differences approach. A potential worry is 
that differences in trends in the outcome measure between groups will bias the 
reform effect. If such a difference exists, one can use a pre-reform common 
support restriction when defining the comparison group, in order to make sure 
that the counterfactual is well defined.  
In order to investigate whether pre-reform differences in trends exist, 
Equation (A1) is estimated over the years 1995-1999. The core grades 
( ) are regressed on a set of individual characteristics (X
core
ismt GPA ismt), school 
effects  (χs), time effects (χt), municipality effects (χm), and interactions for 
schools being located in Stockholm with time (SSit). Subscript i denotes 
student, s school, t time, and m municipality.  
 
(A1)           ismt it m t s ismt
core
ismt SS X GPA μ θ χ χ χ δ κ + + + + + + =  
 
By studying the interaction-terms of schools situated in Stockholm with 
time, the presence of a descending trend cannot be ruled out, see column (1) of 
Table A1. In 1996, the interaction term was (insignificantly) positive with a 
point estimate of 0.67. This interaction effect becomes smaller and eventually 
negative over the years. 
Therefore, the five pre-reform years (1995-1999) is used to define the 
Comparison group by applying a common support restriction. This is done in 
the following way. Linear municipality-specific trends are included additively 
to Equation (A1), and are estimated conditional on the covariates. If a munic-
ipality has a trend significantly different from Stockholm at the 1%-level, the 
municipality is excluded from the Comparison group. This procedure implied 
that 4 of the 25 municipalities in the Comparison group were excluded.
23 A 
difference-in-differences analysis is then performed over 1999 and 2000, 
according to Equation (A1). The result, displayed in column (2) of Table A1, 




                                                      
23 In 2000, about 1 500 students attended a school in these municipalities. 
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2-adj 0.500  0.545  0.545 
Time period  1995-1999  1999-2000  1999-2000 
N  85 172  28 811  24 797 
Note: The outcome variable is percentile ranked core grades. Regressions include 
controls for time, upper secondary school attended, compulsory school attended, 
program, and municipality where the student resides. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses.  Significance level: * = 10%, ** = 5%, and *** = 1%.    
 
 
IFAU – School choice and student achievement – new evidence on open-enrolment  25 The result could be sensitive to the level of exclusion, meaning that the 
procedure does not fully cope with differences in trends. Therefore, another 
specification is used, where a municipality is excluded in the first step if it has 
a pre-existing trend significantly different from Stockholm at the 25%-level. 
This implied that another 6 municipalities were dropped. The result, presented 
in Column (3), is very similar to the one in column (2). Hence, the 1% 
exclusion restriction is considered sufficient, and is chosen to constitute the 
baseline model.   
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The empirical analysis uses grades as the outcome measure, and it also uses 
grades as a measure of initial ability. This appendix studies whether grade 
inflation at the compulsory level and/or the upper secondary level is driving the 
results.  
 
Grade inflation at compulsory level 
An indirect test for grade inflation at the compulsory level is conducted by 
restricting the compulsory grade variable to the average of the grades in 
English, Math, and Swedish (denoted GPA
SME  in the descriptive statistics). 
Grade inflation should not be a concern for these subjects (to the same extent) 
since the teachers have National test scores as guidelines in the grade-setting. 
In this analysis, the same first-step common support restriction is used as in 
Appendix A, but now with the compulsory GPA
SME instead of the ordinary 
compulsory GPA as a measure of initial ability. This implies that six 
municipalities are being dropped according to the 1% exclusion restriction. The 
model is then estimated in three specifications, corresponding to the first 
column in the upper parts of Table 4 and Table 5, which is reproduced in the 
upper part of Table B1. That is, the average treatment effect in three speci-
fications. Column (1) includes all students, and Column (2) and (3) are 
conditional on completion. Column (1) and (2) use core subjects as the 
outcome measure, and Column (3) uses ordinary grades. 
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SME.  























2-adj  0.545 0.692 0.602 
N  28 811  18 853  18 853 
Compulsory GPA









2-adj  0.483 0.654 0.539 
N  26 327  17 627  17 627 
Note: Regressions include a constant, and controls for gender, age, immigrant status, 
compulsory school grades, parental education and earnings, time effects, upper 
secondary school attended, compulsory school attended, program, and municipality 
where the student resides. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance level: 
* = 10%, ** = 5%, and *** = 1%.    
 
The estimates are very similar. With GPA
SME the point estimates are 
identical for the full sample, and somewhat smaller when conditioning on 
completion. Hence, this test does not suggest that grade inflation at the 
compulsory level in Stockholm is driving the results.   
 
Grade inflation at upper secondary level 
Grade inflation at the upper secondary level is studied with use of National test 
scores in English, Swedish, and Math. For a national sample of around 10% of 
the upper secondary schools, tests are collected on a yearly basis, and are 
available for this study. Two things should be noted about the test score data. 
First, test scores cannot be matched at the individual level, only per program 
and school, making the analysis relying on class averages (i.e. program per 
school). Second, there is no information on when the students complete upper 
secondary schooling, making the analysis relying on the assumption that the 
students taking national tests complete in the stipulated time. We know that this 
IFAU – School choice and student achievement – new evidence on open-enrolment  28is an approximation, but it is only a problem if the completion probability 
varies systematically between groups over time.  
With grades (Gpst) as the outcome measure, Equation (B1) is estimated at 
the class level for each subject. Subscript p denotes program, s school, and t 
time. Explanatory variables are class averages of background characteristics 
(Xpst), program fixed effects (λp), school fixed effects (λs), time fixed effects 
(λt), national test scores (NTpst), and a vector of products of a Stockholm school 
indicator and time (SSpt).  
 
(B1)         pst pt pst
NT
t s p pst
X
pst SS NT X G η τ ρ λ λ λ ρ φ + + + + + + + =  
 
The coefficients of interest are the τ:s, which show how grades evolves in 
Stockholm compared to the Comparison group, conditional on the set of 
covariates and the National test scores. Hence, this procedure tests for 
systematic differences between grades and test scores in the two groups. The 
results are shown in Table B2. The coefficients are insignificant, and it is 
impossible to spot any trends. Hence, the results do not indicate systematic 
differences in grade inflation between the groups.   
 
Table B2 Tests for grade inflation at upper secondary level. 






























2 0.898 0.913 0.884 
N 139  174  136 
Note: Regressions are at the class level, and include a constant, and controls for gender, 
age, immigrant status, compulsory school grades, parental education and earnings, time 
effects, school effects, and program. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, and 
regressions are weighted by class size.  Significance level: * = 10%, ** = 5%, and *** 
= 1%. 
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